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ZONING-TOWNSHIPS-COMPLETE EXCLUSION OF TRAILER CAMPS AND 
PARKS-Plaintiff challenged the validity of an amendment to the zoning 
ordinance of the defendant township which barred all trailer camps and 
parks from its industrial district. As trailer parks had previously been 
zoned out of the business, residential, and agricultural districts, this amend-
ment had the effect of completely excluding them from the entire town-
ship, although approximately half of its twenty-three square miles consisted 
of open rural area. The parties stipulated that the plans of the plaintiff, 
who wanted to develop a trailer park on his premises, met all of the 
applicable health standards. The trial court sustained the amendment, but 
its decision was reversed by the appellate division.1 On appeal by the 
township to the New Jersey Supreme Court, held, reversed, two justices 
dissenting.2 As the exclusion of trailer parks was deemed necessary to 
enable the township to realize its full potential for extensive and rapid 
growth as a well-ordered community attractive to industry, the amendment 
to the zoning ordinance barring trailer parks from its industrial district 
constitutes a valid exercise of the zoning power of the township. Vickers 
v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 233 (1963). 
The power to zone is derived from the police power of a state. Town-
ships, or other political subdivisions of a state, must rely upon a specific 
delegation of this power, by statute or constitutional provision, as a pre-
requisite to its exercise.3 The zoning power is also subject to the more 
1 Vickers v. Township Comm., 68 N.J. Super. 263, 172 A.2d 218 (1961). 
2 The dissenting justices felt that it was arbitrary to permit the prohibition of mobile 
home parks in a municipality where they can be placed in appropriate districts and 
where there is a demand for them. 
3 YOKLEY, ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE § 27 (1948). The New Jersey constitution em-
powers the legislature to enact general laws "under which municipalities ••. may adopt 
zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified districts and regulating therein, 
buildings and structures, according to their construction, and the nature and extent of 
their use and the nature and extent of the uses of land, and the exercise of such 
authority shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State." N.J. CoNsr. 
art. IV, § 6. Pursuant to this provision the New Jersey legislature has given municipali-
ties extensive power to create districts and regulate structures and the use of land 
therein through the use of zoning ordinances. N.J. REv. STAT.§§ 55-30 to -31 (1937). For a 
complete discussion of the delegation of the police power of a state to municipalities 
or other governmental units, see 6 McQUII..LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §§ 24.86 to 
.39 (3d ed. 1949). 
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general and elusive limitation that its arbitrary and unreasonable use to 
effectuate the absolute prohibition of a type of property use that is not 
detrimental to the public welfare will be deemed unconstitutional as a 
denial of equal protection of the laws and of due process of law:1 
Although the courts have the power to prevent the exercise of the police 
power from infringing constitutional rights, judicial supervision is re-
stricted in this context by an assumption that a zoning ordinance is 
warranted by the location, property, and surroundings to which it applies.5 
When the reasonableness of an ordinance is in question, the courts often 
decline to substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body which 
is charged with the primary duty and responsibility with respect to zoning 
matters.6 Since opinions dealing with exclusionary zoning ordinances often 
speak in generalities, it is difficult to discern a pattern of standards into 
which such an ordinance must fit in order to be upheld. Few courts have 
been faced with this problem in the context of a total exclusion of trailer 
parks from a municipal unit, as the vast majority of governmental units 
have chosen rather to relegate trailer parks to certain defined areas and 
impose particular health and safety regulations on them.7 Decisions which 
have upheld ordinances precluding trailer parks in a particular area of 
a municipal unit are based on a wide variety of rationales. For instance, 
exclusion from a residential district has been deemed justifiable to prevent 
sewage disposal problems,8 overcrowding of schools,9 and diminution of 
surrounding property values.10 A Detroit ordinance requiring neighbor-
hood consent to the presence of trailer parks was upheld on the basis of 
public interest in having no large groups of people living in homes for 
which they pay no real estate taxes.11 The validity of an ordinance which 
completely excluded heavy industry from a municipality was in issue in the 
Duffcon case.12 The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion indicated that 
such an ordinance may be imposed if in accordance with the most appro-
priate use of the land throughout the municipality and that such appro-
priateness may depend not only upon the physical, economic, and social 
conditions prevailing within the municipality and its present and reason-
ably prospective needs, but also upon the nature of the entire region in 
which the municipality is located and the use to which the land in such 
4 6 J\!cQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 24.63; 7 id. §§ 24.324 to .325; RATHKOPF, THE 
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 6 (2d ed. 1949). See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 774, 779 (1952). 
Ii RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 6, 18; YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 35·36. 
o RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 4, § 19. 
7 HODES & ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE Ho?t!ES 88 (1957). The authors of 
this book have set out all of the state statutes dealing with mobile homes up to 1957 
and present an extensive discussion of various aspects of the law dealing with mobile 
homes. ' 
8 Stevens v. Township of Royal Oak, 342 Mich. 105, 68 N.W.2d 787 (1955). 
o Ibid. 
10 Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959). 
11 Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939). 
12 Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). 
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region has been or may appropriately be put. The court upheld the ordi-
nance on the grounds that the physical location and circumstances of the 
small residential municipality were such that it was best suited for con-
tinued residential development and, separated from it but in the same 
geographical region, there was present a concentration of industry in an 
area peculiarly adapted to industrial development and sufficiently large 
to accommodate such development for years to come. The United States 
Supreme Court has pointed out that a regulatory ordinance "which would 
be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as 
applied to rural communities."13 This distinction has been applied by 
state courts to invalidate ordinances excluding trailer parks from agricul-
tural areas on the grounds that exclusion from an open and undeveloped 
area neither promotes nor has a reasonable and substantial relation to 
the public welfare.14 Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court has re-
fused to compromise an owner's right to free use of property on the basis 
of speculation that conditions might develop with regard to which the 
application of the ordinance would enhance the public welfare.15 
On the other hand, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
the principal case seems to leave no theoretical limitation on the exclusion 
of trailer parks by state governmental units. The court based its decision 
on precedent and upon the proposition that zoning must subserve the 
long-range needs of the comm.unity. The court broadly construed lan-
guage from a decision which had upheld an ordinance of a small and com-
pletely developed borough prohibiting future construction of apartment 
houses within its borders16 to mean that a municipality does not have to 
provide for every type of land use within its borders. In the same vein the 
court relied upon a case which had upheld an ordinance barring motels 
from a developed community consisting of business, residential, and in-
dustrial zones.17 At no point in its opinion did the court cite a case which 
13 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). This is the 
landmark case on comprehensive zoning in the United States, the reasoning of which 
has been widely referred to and relied upon by state and federal courts throughout the 
years. YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 20. Since the Euclid decision, the Supreme Court 
has practically withdrawn from the zoning field, with certiorari being consistently refused 
in zoning cases since 1930. 
14 Gust v. Township of ·Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955) (township ordi-
nance); Stevens v. Stillman, 18 Misc. 2d 274, 186 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (town 
ordinance). 
15 Gust v. Township of Canton, supra note 14. 
16 Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958). The 
court also relied on the case of Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 
1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). Problems of total exclusion of certain land uses, analogous 
to those presented by the principal case, have arisen under high minimum lot size 
zoning regulations and high minimum floor space regulations, as exemplified respectively 
in Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952), and Lionshead 
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. -165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952). For commentary on 
these cases and a general discussion of zoning law in New Jersey, see Cunningham, 
Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 37 (1959). 
17 Pierro v. Ba.xendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955). 
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dealt with the exclusion of a particular mode of living from a spacious and 
undeveloped area; therefore, something more than stare decisis was needed 
to sustain the holding. In a prior decision the court had committed itself 
to the view that zoning must subserve long-range objectives as well as the 
needs of the present and immediately foreseeable future.18 It was argued 
that maximum community benefits in the future could be derived only 
from comprehensive zoning which provided for an attractive industrial 
area and compatible residential districts. The court pointed out that the 
current industrial development in the state is taking place in communities 
where nuisances are excluded and attractive architecture prevails. There-
fore, the court held that, in order to attract industry, trailer parks, which 
bring problems of congestion and "attendant difficulties," may be excluded. 
This rationale did not meet the thrust of the plaintiff's argument that the 
township's development was not in fact simply limited to industrial and 
residential uses. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
question of whether the power exists to forbid a particular type of prop-
erty use is to be determined by considering the thing not abstractly, but 
in connection with the existing circumstances and locality.19 Although 
the court in the principal case attempted to justify its decision by pointing 
to the need for an appropriate residential-industrial balance in the future, 
the efficacy of this rationale is dubious since no industry was contemplating 
a move into the township in the foreseeable future, and, even if industry 
did move into the township, there was no indication that such an event 
would change its course of diversified development. Neither practical 
reality nor precedent justify excluding trailer parks from many square miles 
of open area in which there is no conflict between trailer living and other 
surrounding uses. 
Such exclusionary ordinances have the potential of adversely affecting 
a large number of people.20 Often the assumptions on which they are based, 
linking trailer parks with itinerants and squalor, are no longer generally 
valid;21 in fact, some trailer parks fall within the luxury living category,22 
and the primary groups living in trailer parks today are undoubtedly respect-
able citizens.23 There are many means of trailer park control, other than 
18 Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959). 
10 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
20 The number of mobile home dwellers has increased significantly in the last decade 
to an all-time high of three million in 1960. BARTLEY &: BAm, MOBILE HoME PARKS AND 
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING 12 (1960). Between 1951 and 1956 the mobile 
home population doubled. HODES &: ROBERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 3. 
21 It is obvious that these assumptions often result in overt hostility toward the 
mobile home-owning class. For example, one township ordinance dealt with trailers and 
gypsies together. Commonwealth v. Amos, 44 Pa. D. &: C. 125 (C.P. 1941). In the case 
of Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939), the counsel for the city 
asserted that trailer living tended to create immorality among children. 
22 Fogarty, Trailer Parks: The Wheeled Suburbs, Architectural Forum, July 1959, 
p. 127. 
23 According to HoDES &: ROBERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4, the primary 
groups of people who dwell in mobile homes are (1) young married couples, (2) defense 
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total exclusion from a municipal unit, which protect the public from any 
possible adverse effects attending the presence of a trailer park in the com-
munity.24 The most common measures take the form of stringent health 
standards which must be complied with in order to qualify for and keep 
the necessary license,25 and the imposition of reasonable building code 
standards to prevent overcrowding.26 The power of a governmental unit 
to tax trailers and trailer parks in order to meet regulatory expenses is 
well established.27 With such regulatory measures available, a community 
which, as in the principal case, encompasses a large amount of undeveloped 
land could effectively provide for its long-range objectives without adopt-
ing the extreme measure of wholly excluding this popular mode of living. 
Specifically, special zones could be established, within the now undeveloped 
areas, in which trailer parks would be allowed. These zones could provide 
for a minimum proximity to any adjacent land uses with which the pres-
ence of a trailer park would be incompatible. Such a solution would allow 
the greatest possible use of property by landowners, while at the same 
time permitting the municipal officials to effect the valid objectives of 
the local zoning power. 
Rolfe A. Worden, S.Ed. 
and construction workers, (3) military personnel, (4) seasonal harvest workers, (5) travel-
ing businessmen, and (6) retired people. 
24 For example, one community limited the number of trailers within its borders 
to those within the city at the time the ordinance was passed in order to keep a high 
ratio of permanent to transient population. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., ZONING CODE § 47-49 
(1947). Another community limited trailer parks to areas zoned for multiple housing, 
subject to the restriction that they could not be located within 200 feet of permanent 
residential buildings located outside the district. This ordinance was upheld in Huff 
v. City of Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 56 N.W.2d 54 (1952). 
25 Local ordinance provisions restricting trailers to licensed parks are commonplace, 
and they have been upheld as reasonably adopted to promote the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the community. Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1953); Town-
ship of Wyoming v. Herweyer, 321 Mich. 611, 33 N.W.2d 93 (1948). See, e.g., MASS. 
ANN. LAws ch. 140, § 32A-B (1957), which provides for the licensing of trailer parks by 
the board of health of a town or city with provision for periodic inspection by the 
state and local health boards. 
26 However, unreasonable building code standards are among the vehicles used to 
effect the exclusion of trailers from a community. For instance, one community forced 
trailers to leave because they could not meet a building code requirement of 384 square 
feet to the first floor. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 168 Pa. Super. 442, 78 A.2d 880 
(1951). It has been observed that trailers often cannot meet floor space requirements 
without violating vehicle regulations, leaving the law-abiding trailer owner in a dilemma. 
Brodnick v. Munger, 102 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1951). 
27 There is some dispute with respect to the methods of providing for additional 
general community expenses resulting from the presence of a mobile home population. 
The problem of taxation of trailers and trailer parks has been dealt with extensively. 
See Note, 57 DICK. L. R.Ev. 338 (1953); Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. R£v. 738 (1955); Comment, 
71 YALE L.J. 702 (1962). 
